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STATE1\1ENT OF CASE
A. NATURE OF THE CASE

Respondent does not dispute the Appellant's version of the statement of the case and
therefor will not repeat it verbatim.

B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

Respondent does not dispute the Appellant's version of the course of proceedings and
therefor will not repeat it verbatim

C STATE1\1ENT OF FACTS

Plaintiff/Appellant hereinafter referred to as "Lingnaw," purchased property located at
201 South 6th in Challis, Idaho in the spring of 2017. Lingnaw is a registered sex offender and
cannot loiter within 500 feet from the property line of school grounds of this state, nor reside
within 500 feet of property where a school is located,. See Idaho Code§ 18-8329(b) and/or (d).
Lingnaw conceded that from his home to the school property is less than 500 feet and according
to his measurement it was 258 feet. (Tr.p.17-18) He also testified that from the top of his house
to the stack (chimney in the middle of the building) on the gymnasium was 504 feet. (Tr.p.18-19,
70-71).
Lingnaw acknowledged that part of the school property has extracurricular activities
present, (Tr.p.18 Ln 13-18), that his stepdaughter attended school in the building (Tr.p.12-13 and
p.32 Ln 17-25), that a sign on the front of the building clearly states "Home of the Vikings,
Challis Junior High School" (Tr.p.35-36, and 74-75), that behind the building is a ball field used
by children (Tr.p.41-42), that he has observed children use the property (Tr.p.45), that school
aged children use the buildings in the evening (Tr.p.46-47).
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Lingnaw did no independent research to determine if a school or school property was
within 500 feet of his residence prior to the purchase. He relied upon his sex offender registry
officer Doug Sugden from Twin Falls to advise him if he could purchase the home. (Tr.p. 37, 61,
and 84 ), he has the ability to check public records to determine the locations of school property,
but did not do so (Tr.p. 49-51), he did no independent research to determine if his residence was
in compliance with the statute prior to moving in. (Tr.p.61-63.)

Lani Rembeilski is the Elementary Principal and Superintendent of the School District.
She testified that there are three schools in Challis, the elementary, high school and middle
school on main street (Tr.p.89-92). The building on main street with the gymnasium is the
middle school. (Tr.p.94 Ln 15-25, p.115). That the auditorium within the middle school is used

by children (Tr.p.91-97), and is the only auditorium available to the students in Challis (Tr.p.101
Ln 15-20). That the middle school has been used for school instruction during times when it is
needed. (Tr.p.102 Ln 15~24). It has been a school since at least 1975 and is still considered one of
the District's schools. (Tr.p.105-107). The fields behind the school are considered the schools
baseball fields and used by schoolchildren, and the gym is used on an almost daily basis for

school sponsored activities. (Tr. p.109-111 ).
Jacquet Bruno, the Custer County Assessor, testified that by using the online county
software the measurements from Lingnaw' s house to the school property line was 173 feet.
(Tr.p.139 Ln 18-25) and that a 500 foot radius from Lingnaw's house includes the middle school,

the ball fields and the whole gymnasium. From Lingnaw's house it is 480 feet to the front door of
the gym which is almost the furthest point of the building.(Tr.p.138-139).

Respondent's Brief On Appeal
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ISSlJES ON APPEAL
Respondent requests that this court modify the issues of appeal as follows:

(A)

Was this declaratory judgment action properly used by Ungnaw to attempuo bar

a subsequent criminal prosecution.

(B)

Whether Lingnaw met his burden of proof to show that the definition of a schoot

in Idaho Code§ 18~8329(d) did not apply to him.

(C)

Whether or not the Court abused its discretion/erred in denying the parties the

opportunity to present closing argument.

(D)

Did the court err in failing to award attorney fees to Respondent in the underlying

action and is Respondent entitled to an award of attorney fees in this appeal.

Respondent's Brief On Appeal
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ARGUMENT

(A)

Was this declaratory judgment action properly used by Lingnaw to attempt

to bar a subsequent criminal prosecution.

The Plaintiff in this matter requested that the Court issue a decision that essentially
prohibited the Defendant from arresting/prosecuting him for a violation of Idaho Code § 188329( d). The courts have been hesitant in allowing the declaratory judgment act to be used as an
advisory opinion.
This Court in Country Ins. Co. v. Agricultural Development, Inc., 107 Idaho 961,695
P.2d 346, (1984) stated that "The Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act does not license litigants to
fish in judicial ponds for legal advice." Id at 794.
This Court stated:
"We can well appr~ciate that the parties would prefer a definite answer by this
court to the questions posed by petitioner's points rather than to take an "educated
guess" based upon a study of our prior decided cases and authoritative materials as
to what we would hold,--as, if and when the questions are presented in justiciable
form. However, the giving of advice as to proposed or possible settlements is not
a judicial function. As a practical matter if for no other reason, this must be left to
the profession. Id at 973. In Lide v. Mears, 231 N.C. 111, 56 S.E.2d 404 (1949),
cited with approval in the Puretex case, the North Carolina Supreme Court said:
!!There is much misunderstanding as to the object and scope of this legislation
(Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act). Despite some notions to the contrary. it
does not undertake to convert judicial tribunals into counselors and impose upon
them the duty of giving advisory opinions to any parties who may come into court
and ask for either academic enlightenment or practical guidance concerning their
legal affairs. Town of Tryon v. Duke Power Co .. 222 N.C. 200, 22 S.E.2d 450
[1942]~ Allison v. Sharp, 209 N.C. 477. 184 S.E. 27 [1936]; Poore v. Poore. 201
N.C. 791. 161 S.E. 532 [1931]~ Anderson on Declaratory Judgments. section 13.
Id at 974.

In MDS Investments, L.L.C. v. State, 138 Idaho 456, 65 P.3d 197, (2003) this Court stated
that:
"The Plaintiffs contend that they should be entitled to have their rights defined in a
declaratory judgment action so that they do not have to risk criminal prosecution. Their
rights could be defined in these declaratory judgment actions only if this Court were to
Respon<lcnt"s Brief On Appeal
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hold that a judgment in their favor in these actions could bar a subsequent criminal
prosecution under the doctrine of res judicata, [1] or that an adverse ruling would
establish their crimin.al liability. If we were to so hold, it would, in effect, enable persons
suspected of criminal activity to take control of their own criminal prosecutions. They
could determine whether and when to commence the prosecutions and what offense(s) to
charge, thereby interfering with the discretion that rightfully belongs to the prosecuting
attorney" Id at 460. Also see Note (1) "If the judgment in the declaratory judgment action
could not be used defensively to bar a subsequent criminal prosecution, then it would not
define the Plaintiffs' rights in the manner that they desire. Because the judgment would
not bar relitigation of the same issues in a later criminal proceeding, the judgment would
simply constitute the opinion of the trier of fact in the declaratory judgment action
regarding the Plaintiffs' possible criminal culpability if they were later charged with
crimes. The Plaintiffs can obtain opinions regarding their criminal culpability from their
counsel. There is no need to alter the burden of proof in order to enable them to obtain a
second opinion from the trier of fact in the declaratory judgment action." Id at 466.

In this matter Lingnaw requested that the court issue a order in regards to his ability to
legally reside at the property and an Injunction directing parties to comply with that order. See
Amended Complaint. As a result of Lingnaw's request essentially attempting to bar a future

prosecution of him for a violation of Idaho Code § 18-8329(d), he was seeking legal advice from
the court and then asking the court to bar a future prosecution, which is what this Court has
consistently declined to use the Declaratory Judgment Act to do.

(B)

Whether Lingnaw met his burden of proof to show that the definition of a

school, in Idaho Code § 18-8329( d) did not apply to him.

If this Court determines that the District Court had jurisdiction under the Declaratory
Judgment Act to grant Lingnaw the relief he requested, the record is clear that Lingnaw was in
violation of the statute.
Lingnaw cited the correct legal standard in his brief:
As set forth in Bettwieser v. New York Irrigation Dist.~ 154 Idaho 317 (2013):
When this Court reviews a trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law
after a bench trial, the review is "limited to ascertaining whether the evidence supports
the findings of fact. and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law."
Respondent's Brief On Appeal
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Borah v. McCandless, 147 Idaho 73, 77,205 P.3d 1209, 1213 (2009) (citing Benninger v.
Derifield, 142 Idaho 486, 488-89, 129 P.3d 1235, 1237-38 (2006)). Because "it is the
province of the trial court to weigh conflicting evidence and testimony and to judge the
credibility of the witnesses," this Court liberally construes the trial court's findings of fact
in favor of the judgment. Id. (citing Rowley v. Fuhmwn, 133 Idaho 105, 107, 982 P.2d
940, 942 (1999)). "This Court will not set aside a trial court's findings of fact unless the
findings are clearly erroneous." Id. (citing Ransom v. Topaz Mktg., L.P., 143 Idaho 641,
643. 152 P.3d 2, 4 (2006): I.R.C.P. 52(a)). Therefore, if the trial court's findings are
based upon "substantial evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting," those finding will
not be overturned on appeal. Id. (citing Benninger, 142 Idaho at 489, 129 P.3d at 1238).
Nor will this Court substitute its view of the facts for that of the trial court. Id. (citing
Ransom, 143 Idaho at 643, 152 P.3d at 4). ~'This Court exercises free review over matters
of law." Id. (citing Bolger v. Lance, 137 Idaho 792, 794, 53 P.3d 1211. 1213 (2002)).
The term "substantial evidence" is further discussed in the case of City of Middleton v.
Coleman Homes, LLC, 163 Idaho 716 (2018) as follows:
This Court will not set aside a trial court's findings of fact unless the findings are
clearly erroneous." Mortensen v. Berian, 163 Idaho 47, 50. 480 P.3d 45, 48 (2017)
(quoting Borah v. McCandless, 147 Idaho 73, 77, 205 P.3d 1209, 1213 (2009)). "Clear
error will not be deemed to exist if the findings are supported by substantial and
competent, though conflicting, evidence." Id. (quoting Pandrea v. Barrett, 160 Idaho
165, 171. 369 P.3d 943,949 (2016)). Evidence is substantial and competent if a
reasonable trier of fact could accept and rely upon the evidence in making a factual
finding. Id. (citing Greenfield v. Wurmlinger, 158 Idaho 591. 598, 349 P.3d 1182, 1189
(2015)).

In this matter the record was clear that the "Challis Middle School'' was one of the three
schools in Challis. It clearly was labeled as such, was used by children for their educational and
extra-curricular activities and was within 500 feet of Lingnaw's home.
Lingnaw is hung up on his definition of a school that he continues to use, "a traditional
school. i.e. there is no academic instruction occurring at the building and that there are no
children dropped of in the morning at said building." See Appellants Brief p 7.
Lingnaw's proposed definition is in error. Common sense dictates that the school
auditorium and/ or gymnasium is part of a school. Blacks Law Dictionary defines school as "An
institution or place for instruction or education" It further defines public schools as "Schools
established under the laws of the state (and usually regulated in matters of detail by the local
authorities). in the various districts. counties, or towns, maintained at the public expense by

Respondent's Brief On Appeal
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taxation, and open, usually without charge, to the children of all the residents of the city, town or
other district. Schools belonging to the public and established and conducted under public
authority. "See Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed.1990).

If the legislature wanted Idaho Code §18-8329(d) to be limited to just the school building
itself, then they easily could have done so as they did in Idaho Code§ 18-8329(a), or school
property as in Idaho Code§ 18-8329(b). The legislature in (d) clearly made as broad of a

definition as possible to protect school children and used the words "on which a school is
located." This definition is as broad as possible so that registered sex offenders can not live
within 500 feet of a school.
The evidence in this matter clearly showed that this property is a school. As a result of
the substantial and competent evidence showing that Lingnaw purchased a home within 500 feet
of "on which a school is located" the court did not err in denying Lingnaw the relief that he
requested.

(C)

Whether or not the Court abused its discretion/erred in denying the parties

the opportunity to present closing argument.

In the State of Idaho, in the context of a criminal case,"the accused has the

constitutional right to counsel which includes the right to closing argument. State v. Gilbert 65
Idaho 210, 142 P.2d 584 (1943).
Although it may be unusual for a court not to offer counsel the opportunity to make
closing argument in a civil bench trial. the undersigned was unable to find any Idaho Case law on
this issue.
In some states the courts have found that it is not error to forego closing arguments in a

bench trial.
The great weight of authority is that in a non-jury civil case 11 I the refusal of the trial
court to allow a litigant's counsel to argue the case is not prejudicial error. Id .. § S(h) at
1431-1436; see Later Case Service thereto at 763-764. Many of the decisions are based
Respondent's Brief On Appeal
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upon the theory that in a trial before the court without a jury. argument of counsel is a
privilege. not a right, which is accorded the parties by the trial com1 in its discretion. This
reliance on the discretion of the judge is in accord with the view of the role of the trial
judge in this jurisdiction. In State v. Hutchinson, Md.App .. 271 A.2d 641. filed 16
December 1970 the Court of Appeals noted 'the professional expertise. experience, and
judicial temperament with which our legal system has inherently invested a trial judge vis
a vis a jury composed of laymen.' It said: 'It is true that judges. being flesh and blood are
subject to the same emotions and human frailties as effect other members of the spccie(s);
however, by his legal training. traditional approach to problems. and the very state of the
art of his profession. he must early learn to perceive. distinguish and interpret the nuances
of the law which are its 'warp and woof." We believe that argument by counsel upon
submission of a civil case tried without a jury is a matter within the discretion of the trial
court. We find no abuse of discretion in the circumstances here. Fritts v. Fritts. 1I
Md.App. 195. 273 A.2d 648, (Md.App. 1971)

Other states including North Dakota have adopted the rule that it is a violation in a civil
case to not allow closing argument~ The Supreme Court of North Dakota held in Fuhrman v.

Fuhrman, 254 N. W.2d 97, 101 (1977), that litigants in civil nonjury cases (and~ of course, in all
11

criminal and jury cases as well) have a right to have their attorneys make a final argument."
It appears that different jurisdictions have split decisions. In Idaho there are certain civil
cases where you are entitled to the appointment of counsel including termination of parental
rights, post conviction relief, etc. If you are entitled to counsel by statute then you should be
entitled to closing arguments by appointed counsel. If however, you are not entitled to appointed
counsel by constitution, rule or statute then in a bench triat to a judge, what is the reasoning
behind guaranteeing closing arguments from counsel.
Further. as can be seen from the record. counsel for Lingnaw did interrupt the court to
clarify the statute. If counsel wanted to make closing argument he should have interru:pted the
courts findings and requested it. Counsels failure to demand closing argument makes this issue, if

enor. not prejudicial.

If Appellant felt that because of the failure to allow closing argument, the court erred in
some finding of fact or conclusion of law which Appellant felt the court needed to review. He
had the opportunity to file a motion to reconsider which was not done.

Respondenfs Brief On Appeal
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(D)

Did the court err in failing to award attorney fees to Respondent in the

underlying action and is Respondent entitled to an award of attorney fees in this appeal.

In the underlying case the court denied Respondents request for attorney fees and costs.
The court erred when it made the findings that Lingnaw did not bring the case frivolously,
unreasonable, or without foundation.
Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 10-1210, Idaho Code§ ,12-117, and Idaho Code§ 12-121,
Respondent should have been awarded his attorney fees and costs in the underlying case. There
was no reason for Lingnaw to sue the local sheriff and request an order to prohibit him from
arresting/prosecuting Lingnaw. As has been outlined above, that is a request for an advisory
opinion, or legal advise from the court. which this Court has refused to do in the past. Lingnaw
could have filed an action to clarify what the statute meant, what the court understood the
legislature to mean, when stating "'of which a school is located'' or some other legitimate
claim/cause of action. Because his claim had no legal basis it was therefor frivolous,
unreasonable. and without foundation and fees and costs should have been awarded.

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
Respondent further requests that this Court award attorney fees and costs on appeal
pursuant to Idaho Code 10-1210, Idaho Code 12-117, and Idaho Code 12-121. Respondent
requests that this court find that the appeal was brought frivolously, unreasonably. or without
foundation.
CONCLUSION

Respondent respectfully requests that the Petitioners appeal be denied.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

Respondent's Brief On Appeal
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day of March, 20

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

_!i_,

I certify that, on the
day of March, 2020. I served a copy of the Respondent's
Brief on Appeal in the manner indicated:
Daniel Brown
fullerlaw@cableone.net
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